Federal Dynamics in Canada, the United States, and Switzerland: How Substates’ Internal Organization Affects Intergovernmental Relations

Nicole Bolleyer*

This article argues that internal substate dynamics can systematically account for the organization of intergovernmental relations (IGR) in dual federal systems. Whereas majoritarian executive-legislative relations tend to weaken the institutionalization of intergovernmental arrangements (IGAs), power-sharing executive-legislative relations tend to facilitate it. Two of the mechanisms at work serve to illustrate this point. Given one-party majority cabinets, complete government alternations strongly alter actors’ interest constellations over time, thereby increasing the costs of maintaining stable cross-boundary IGR. Moreover, the heavy impact of a potential electoral loss induces politicians to shift blame to other governments, thereby undermining cross-boundary cooperation. Majoritarian dynamics also weaken integration between IGAs. Furthermore, integration is weakened by compulsory power-sharing structures unbridged by party ties. In contrast to noncompulsory party cooperation, such internal constitutional divides easily undermine the setup of strong interorganizational linkages.

Over the past few decades, policy interdependencies in federal systems have become increasingly pronounced, blurring formally separate jurisdictions and creating incentives for interaction across different spheres of authority. Europeanization and globalization have been identified as major “external” forces that motivate political actors to establish denser cooperation structures. Expanding state responsibilities, in contrast, are a major “internal” force intensifying boundary-crossing policy interdependencies. As a consequence, scholars have observed the strengthening of intergovernmental channels in federal systems (Simeon 2001, 145–147; Börzel 2000, 2001, 2002; Hooghe 1996; Lazar, Telford, and Watts 2003; Peters and Pierre 2001). This article contributes to this body of literature by attempting to account theoretically for the organizational features of intergovernmental arrangements (IGAs) which are set up by substate actors within distinct types of polities, an issue

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still largely unaddressed in research on intergovernmental relations (IGR). In the empirical analysis, in addition to using document analysis to assess the organizational features of IGAs, I will refer to in-depth interviews with intergovernmental officials to capture the actors’ motivations behind setting up particular structures.¹

IGR denote a negotiated, nonhierarchic exchange, not only between institutions on different governmental levels but also between different substates (Peters and Pierre 2001, 131; Agranoff 2004). It has been convincingly shown that the density of these exchanges has increased across Western federal systems. Most striking, however, is that in some countries—such as Canada—cross-boundary exchanges are still primarily channeled directly by the respective ministries. In others, such as Switzerland, external bodies have been created for this purpose. How can one account for this variance? The organizational embeddings set up in federal countries differ on two dimensions: first, regarding the institutionalization of the single IGAs and, second, regarding the integration of the system of IGR, and hence the types of linkages among intergovernmental bodies within one federal system. Throughout this article, the concept of institutionalization will be used with reference to single intergovernmental bodies as the entity of analysis. Integration, in contrast, will be used with reference to the system level.

This article focuses on IGAs as the variety of organizational aspects that characterize IGR in federal systems. IGR can be realized in ad hoc coordination or in codecision. Ad hoc coordination captures the mutual adjustment of policies or, alternatively, position taking toward the center on an ad hoc basis, whereas codecision denotes regular decision making (Cameron 2001, 125; Elazar 1991, 76; Scharpf 1997). The underlying rationale is that each form of interaction tends to go hand in hand with a different organizational embedding. Voluntary mutual adjustment (i.e., ad hoc coordination) does not demand regularity of meetings, a bureaucratically supported and internally differentiated body, a formal decision-making rule, or the legally binding status of agreements (Opeskin 2001, 130; Cameron 2001; Simmons 2004). On the contrary, these are empirical features characteristic of a highly institutionalized environment that should facilitate codecision. Ad hoc coordination tends to lack these features and allows for maximal flexibility and the autonomy of the participating parties. It does so at the price of decreased reliability, usually accompanying strong institutionalization.

Hence, both the institutionalization and the integration of intergovernmental structures are crucial. First, they affect the capacity of constituent states to form a common front against the federal government and thereby shape the distribution of power within a federal system and, at the same time, tendencies against or toward centralization. Second, the arrangements for horizontal interaction have important implications for the capacity of political actors to harmonize policy across substate borders. To give one example, intergovernmental agreements set up within the weakly institutionalized Canadian arrangements usually do not transcend position
taking against federal plans or the demand for more funds. Moreover, compliance is not very reliable. In contrast, the stronger Swiss arrangements lead to intercantonal treaties addressing concrete policy problems.² Accordingly, the organizational dimension of IGR is important, as it provides a key element in understanding the connection between federal structures and the patterns of cross-jurisdictional policymaking.

In order to account for IGAs’ organizational differences, it is argued that internal substate dynamics spill over to the states’ external relations, finding their expression in the organizational makeup of intergovernmental channels. The substates and the federal state are defined as interaction contexts that are institutionally delimited and have specific tasks and competencies assigned to them (Benz 2003). The federal and substate units define and delimit the respective political actors’ home arenas; here politicians have to succeed in elections in order to take over government. If intergovernmental cooperation reduces politicians’ chances to pursue internal goals, this should show in a weaker institutionalization and integration of IGR. Accordingly, institutions constrain and regularize behavior and are set up only if they help actors to pursue their respective goals (Héritier 1996; Scharpf 1997). The focus here is on how intrastate institutions and processes open windows of opportunity to favor or disfavor the setting up of strongly institutionalized and mutually integrated IGAs. High competitive pressure and power concentration in single government units, to refer to only one crucial factor at this point, are likely to undermine the institutionalization of IGAs because they motivate the actors to pursue a strategy of blame shifting.³

**Measuring Institutionalization and Integration**

The institutionalization of IGAs becomes visible, on the one hand, in a process of internal organizational development. This development is directed toward a more complex functional distribution of tasks to different offices or even subunits. On the other, it shows in a process of external differentiation—in their boundedness: the arrangement develops boundaries toward other bodies in terms of its own functions as well as material resources (Judge 2003, 500–501). Table 1 lists the operational criteria used to measure institutionalization in descending order; the more features that are empirically present, the more institutionalized the IGA under examination.⁴

The operational criteria are chosen on the basis of the following reasoning. Even if the density of exchange is quite high at times or regular meetings are set up between the prime ministers and the ministers responsible for particular sectors, institutionalization is considered weak if it is organized directly by the governmental departments without any separate intergovernmental body. Medium institutionalization demands the boundedness of an arrangement that is visible through the assignment of specific competencies, resources, and personnel to an external body.
The investment in the latter indicates that intergovernmental transactions do not express only a momentary interest convergence of a group of individual actors. A core feature of strong institutionalization is a formal decision-making rule that deviates from unanimity because the capacity to bind the substates to common positions or plans to which they did not agree demonstrates that the IGA is thought to represent more than the sum of its parts. Another feature is internal differentiation into offices or organs that have their own formally assigned tasks. Moreover, with increasing formalization and differentiation, the capacity of the body to produce proposals of high specificity increases; the higher the specificity of these proposals, the greater the likelihood of their transfer into state legislation (Simeon 2001, 148; Simmons 2004).^5#

The selection of indicators for intergovernmental integration between IGAs draws on arguments developed in research on party organization (table 2). Analyzing the integration of parties in a federal system, one can distinguish between confederal and integrated parties. The distinction refers to the weak or strong organizational and programmatic linkages between federal and regional party organizations (Smiley 1987). Referring to organizational linkages, weak integration presupposes identifiable contacts between the core IGAs. If, moreover, IGAs meet regularly, medium integration is assumed, whereas strong integration is assumed when the relationship between different bodies and their respective responsibilities is specified by statutes. This indicator is chosen because such statutes stabilize mutual cooperation and reduce conflicts as they clarify each body’s sphere of authority. Furthermore, integration is favored by the absence of several IGAs with similar or equal scope directed toward channeling the same type of exchanges (meaning general or policy-specific coordination)—a constellation that increases the need for integrative linkages and easily generates interorganizational competition.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1</th>
<th>Indicators for the degrees of institutionalization of IGAs</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Density of contacts</td>
<td>Weak institutionalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regularity of meetings</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autonomous organization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own secretariat</td>
<td>Medium institutionalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clearly defined functions</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Formal basis (e.g., formal statutes)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority rule</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal functional differentiation</td>
<td>Strong institutionalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specification of offices</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specification of subunits/organizational units</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Specificity of agreements</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Legal status of agreements</td>
<td></td>
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</table>
Case Selection

IGR—defined as transactional activities and interactions between government units (Agranoff 2004, 29)—are established voluntarily. The actors’ choice to set up intergovernmental structures (or not) is most present in those systems in which each substate possesses considerable law-making authority as well as its own taxing powers, and hence can withdraw from interaction and resort to unilateralism whenever it considers such a path profitable. Such exit options are most widely present in dual federal systems, leading to the selection of Switzerland, Canada, and the United States as cases.

One feature of dual federal systems—in contrast to cooperative ones—is the large number of exclusively assigned competencies, as exclusive competencies provide the two orders of government with considerable autonomy to exercise their respective powers (Thorlakson 2003, 7). As federal research points out, the more powers are assigned to closed “watertight compartments,” the weaker the incentives for cross-boundary interaction. And the more the constitution provides for wide areas of concurrent powers, the stronger the incentives are (Simeon 2001, 148). Looking at the areas of concurrent legislation, the following can be observed: Switzerland ends up with 17.8 percent of concurrent legislation based on the range of policy areas classified, whereas Canada has only 2.5 percent and the United States 13.6 percent (Watts 1999, 126–130). Although the differing amounts of concurrent legislation support stronger IGAs in Switzerland—in comparison to Germany as the prototype of cooperative federalism with 62 percent of concurrent legislation (pp. 126–130)—Switzerland is clearly located on the dual federal side. Regarding the substates’ financial strength, I chose their revenue share as the way to capture governments’ capacities to act independently in their own spheres of competency. In 1995, the revenue share in all three countries was higher than in any other OECD country: 46.72 percent in Switzerland, 41.65 percent in the United States, and 52.21 percent in Canada. A similar picture emerges concerning the share of subnational expenditure in total expenditures (Braun 2000, 39, 52–53).

Both indicators lead to the same conclusion: owing to these core similarities, the three countries can be expected to display a spillover from substates’ inside processes to their outside relations more clearly and the results will be less obscured.

Table 2 Degrees of integration between IGAs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contacts with other IGAs</th>
<th>}</th>
<th>Weak Integration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regularized meetings with other IGAs</td>
<td>}</td>
<td>Medium Integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No coexistence of IGAs with similar scope and functions</td>
<td>}</td>
<td>Strong integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal statutes concerning respective responsibilities and meetings</td>
<td>}</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

How Substates’ Internal Organization Affects IGR

475
by other incentive structures such as the type of competency distribution than would have been the case had cooperative federal systems, such as Germany, been analyzed.

Furthermore, this grouping of cases rules out crucial alternative explanations. First, the sizes of the subunits are similarly diverse across the countries chosen, so the differences in institutionalization and integration cannot be systematically linked to either the absence or the presence of predominant subunits or to strongly differing degrees of weight asymmetry. Moreover, even if single strong substates refuse to cooperate because they can afford to go alone (such as Québec), weaker units would nevertheless gain weight in relation to the federal government if they unified within strong IGAs.

Second, the differences in country size cannot deliver a satisfactory account either. In contrast to the situation in the United States and Canada, the small size of the Swiss polity certainly creates additional pressure for cross-jurisdictional coordination as a result of scarcity of resources and spillover problems among the cantons. Yet, simultaneously, smallness leads to a scarcity of valuable resources that motivates the cantons to insist uncompromisingly on their territory, their political competencies, their financial resources, and their independence (Neidhart 2001, 119–120). Moreover, it is puzzling given the dense personal networks in Swiss federalism owing to its small size that strong IGAs should be necessary at all. In summary, it remains unclear whether small size fosters cooperation or competition—investment in strong IGAs or direct interpersonal exchanges. It also does not solve the problem to use size as a proxy for social heterogeneity and to link big size to territorial and cultural diversity, thereby complicating cooperation, and small size to homogeneity, thereby facilitating cooperation: Switzerland cross-cuts this logic with its considerably heterogeneous societal structure in a small-scale territory.

Consequently, the selection of Canada, the United States, and Switzerland provides for a proper methodological basis to examine the link between the dynamics within the subunits and their outside relations.

A Rationalist Account of Intergovernmental Structures

The reasoning that majoritarian decision making in the substates of a federal polity weakens the degree to which IGAs are institutionalized draws on Lehmbruch’s work on German federalism. In Germany, the tight coupling of arenas in which majoritarian processes interact with an interlocking system of horizontal and vertical cooperation causes considerable tensions. As a consequence, partisan competition delimits politicians’ capacity to strike bargains in the federal arena (Lehmbruch 1978). For dual federalism such as that in Canada, the United States, and Switzerland, one can turn the argument around and develop the following line of reasoning: if federal systems do not provide already strong constitutional predispositions to
develop dense IGR, it should follow that majoritarian processes within single arenas provide incentives against the establishment of a full-fledged system of IGR.

H1a: Given predominantly majoritarian decision-making dynamics in the substates and the center, the degree of institutionalization of IGAs will be weak.

H1b: Given predominantly multiple power sharing in the substates and in the center, the degree of institutionalization of IGAs will be strong.

Yet, how exactly are the “systemic” tensions between majoritarianism within the single governmental units (Lijphart 1999) and strong intergovernmentalism among them rooted in the behavior of the actors? Which causal mechanisms are at work and how can they be measured?

1. The first mechanism refers to the (in)stability of the interest configuration among the constitutive arenas. Given mostly one-party majority cabinets in the constitutive states, government turnover frequently alters the interest configurations among the states. This raises the costs for actors of maintaining strong IGAs. Ad hoc coordination, in contrast, allows politicians to adapt to these changing configurations. They participate in a profitable agreement when their interests converge with those of a certain group of partners; when interests do not converge, they resort to unilateralism. A strongly institutionalized arrangement would limit this flexibility. As soon as coalitions come into play, alternation is less probable as a potential force of change because complete turnovers become less likely. Given mostly oversized coalitions, the interest configuration should be quite stable over time. Under these circumstances, ad hoc coordination is not profitable.12

In order to measure the internally generated competitive pressure, the average rate of complete alternations is used as an indicator (Strøm 1990).13 As it is crucial to capture electoral pressure, I consider only those governments that have been formed after an election. Hence, the alternation rate will be assessed in relation to the absolute number of elections. In the United States, I qualify a shift from a Democratic unified government configuration14 to a Republican one as a complete alternation, and vice versa.15 Although executive and legislative elections are also separate in the Swiss cantons, I will consider only the executive composition because divided government configurations are rather unusual (Vatter 2002).

2. A second aspect that characterizes the interest configuration among substate governments is its ideological congruence (Downs 1998; Thorlakson, forthcoming). If party systems are similar across the substates, congruence is most likely when oversized governments are formed. In this case, the same parties tend to participate in coalitions within different substates; hence, substate coalitions are likely to overlap in composition. Given mainly one-party substate governments, the share of overlapping governments should decrease. The simple assumption here is that the conflict potential between governments should be lower given parties of similar ideological profile in office.16 A first estimate of the conflict potential is the percentage of
nonoverlapping governments, counted as the percentage of one-party governments and of coalitions composed of different sets of parties. The lower this percentage, the lower the conflict potential on the horizontal level tends to be. Based on this percentage, the number of ideologically distinct governments on the horizontal level and their relative weight need to be specified. To do so, I use the Laasko-Taagepera index (Laakso and Taagepera 1979). The higher the figure indicating the number of distinct configurations (5.0 instead of 2.0), the more complex agreement becomes. The more even the distribution of the government configurations’ representation in the substates at a given point (indicated by 2.0 or 3.0 instead of 2.4 or 3.6), the greater the conflict potential that exists, because the ideological profiles are represented with approximately equal strength. Taken together, an average of 5.0 in one country compared with 3.5 in another indicates that in the first country five equally represented configurations have to find agreement compared with four unequally distributed configurations in the second. In the latter configuration, the conflict potential is lower.

3. Given a high likelihood of alternation (again measured by the alternation rate), the immediate threat of electoral loss motivates regional politicians to shift blame onto the other governments. The competitive pressure is thus strongest in two-party systems, which constitute a zero-sum game. Therein, mutual distrust is fostered because each actor knows of the other’s pressure to focus on the short-term goal of electoral victory at the cost of the long-term goal of fruitful intergovernmental exchanges. In such a two-level scenario, the intergovernmental game is therefore clearly subordinated (Cameron and Simeon 2002). If coalitions need to be formed, a party might lose votes but nevertheless repeatedly participate in government. As a result, vote losses do not necessarily mean that a party cannot achieve coalition participation.

4. When parties engage in intergovernmental interaction, autonomy losses are higher for parties that govern alone than for parties that govern in a coalition. If power sharing is a part of daily decision making in one’s home arena, the relative autonomy losses are comparatively minor. The relative autonomy loss of a substate can be measured by the average number of one-party cabinets with and without a majority in the constitutive governments. Regarding the United States, I consider the average number of united government configurations.

Changing from the single IGA as the unit of analysis to the system level of IGR, the distinction between institutionalization and integration is crucial because the two do not always go together; strong institutionalization of the single IGAs does not necessarily lead to strong integration—quite the contrary. Under certain circumstances, a strong institutionalization of single IGAs weakens the integration of the system as a whole. Therefore it needs to be hypothesized under which conditions different intergovernmental bodies are mutually supportive and under which they tend to compete. One important factor that particularly affects the vertical
integration of a system is, again, the internal substate dynamics. With power-concentrating executives on the inside and high autonomy losses through intergovernmental interaction, the bodies responsible for substate exchanges are likely to be directed toward autonomy protection and, with this, against central encroachment. In the same way, the tendency toward shifting blame onto the center should weaken integrative efforts.

H2: Given majoritarian decision-making dynamics in the constitutive arenas of a federal system, a strong vertical integration is unlikely.

Conversely, hypothesis 2 implies that in the case of power sharing in the constitutive government units, interorganizational linkages should be strong. Yet not all power-sharing structures affect actor behavior in the same way (Birchfield and Crepaz 1998; Kaiser 1997). Integration is facilitated only if noncompulsory power sharing is predominant, not in the case of compulsory power sharing. Compulsory power-sharing structures (e.g., bicameralism, presidentialism) are constitutionally entrenched and can be considered as exogenous to the strategic choices of the actors embedded in them. In contrast, noncompulsory power-sharing structures (e.g., coalition governments, corporatism) are deliberatively established by the actors; they are endogenous and are maintained only when they are sufficiently effective. For instance, if a coalition partner disagrees too frequently, the coalition can fall apart and the partner risks losing its veto position. A similar logic is at work in the Swiss referendum democracy. There, the facultative referendum also leads to a situation in which executive actors have a strong interest in maintaining the effectiveness of noncompulsory decision-making arrangements. In Switzerland, a voluntarily implemented proportionality rule characterizes government coalitions on the federal and the cantonal level. Scholars have convincingly argued that the threat of opposition parties to block government policy through a facultative referendum has been a major motivation to form oversized, all-inclusive government coalitions (Neidhart 1970). Yet unlike parliamentary coalition governments, the terms are fixed. Executive actors do not risk bringing down the government by destructive behavior.

Given these institutional circumstances, why should noncompulsory power sharing have a more pronounced effect than the present compulsory structures? Clearly, the proportional composition of governments would be ineffective if certain parties still dominated others in internal decision making. In this case, minor government parties would frequently resort to referenda despite being part of government to compensate for their weak internal position. As in parliamentary coalitions, the stronger government parties are reluctant to impose decisions on weaker government partners in order to protect the government’s decision-making monopoly. That is, they want to keep out of the decision-making arrangement an avoidable veto player that is unpredictable and with which negotiation is not possible, namely the people. In this context, cooperation is motivated not by the threat of
internal dissolution and the resulting loss of veto power, as in the case of parliamentary coalitions, but by its opposite—its potential externalization.

Consequently, actors in noncompulsory structures are assumed to make a more restrictive use of their vetoes than actors in compulsory structures in order to stabilize the distribution of decision-making rights. As externally imposed power sharing is more difficult to overcome because vetoes are more likely to be invoked, compulsory power sharing in the constitutive arenas of a federal state considerably complicates the aggregation of single state positions. In such a context, the capacity of the constitutive governments to link IGAs is easily undermined.

H3: Given dominant compulsory power-sharing structures in the constitutive government units, strong integration is unlikely.

The Empirical Analysis of Intragovernmental Dynamics

In this section the measures discussed earlier are used to assess the intraregional dynamics in favor of or against the institutionalization of IGAs and their mutual integration in Canada, the United States, and Switzerland. Table 3 summarizes the results. The data used cover the governments formed following regional elections after 1980.23

As table 3 indicates, Canada has the highest percentage of one-party governments, the highest rate of complete alterations, and the lowest rate of overlapping governments. Starting with the dominant cabinet type, all substate governments since 1980 have been formed by one party alone, and most of them have had a majority of seats. Autonomy losses generated by intergovernmental interaction are therefore high and weaken the provincial actors’ willingness to invest in IGAs. In addition,

Table 3 Measures of substate dynamics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Percentage of one-party governments</th>
<th>Percentage of complete alternations</th>
<th>Percentage of nonoverlapping governments</th>
<th>Average effective number of nonoverlapping governments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>28.7%a</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>2.735</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>43%b</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>1.651</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>—c</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

aRange 0 percent for Alberta to 50 percent for Québec.
bRange 37–49 percent.
cThe percentage of nonoverlapping governments is only 3.5. The effective number of nonoverlapping governments need not be assessed as it cannot tell us anything substantial about the nature of the configuration.
the number of complete alternations indicates a comparatively high competitive pressure within the provinces, which favors blame shifting and thereby undermines cross-boundary exchanges. Moreover, the interest configuration is likely to change rapidly, which makes flexible ad hoc coordination profitable. As there is only one decision maker per province, such ad hoc coordination is particularly easy. This effect is further strengthened by the noticeable ideological incongruence of the average horizontal interest configurations. There are no government coalitions; hence, none of the ideological configurations overlapped, compared with an average of 43 percent nonoverlapping governments in the United States and an average of 3.5 percent in Switzerland. The average effective number of nonoverlapping governments of 2.735 underlines the fact that there has been not one dominant government type that could have unified the horizontal level ideologically. Instead, two to three configurations have been continuously competing for influence. All in all, intraprovincial and, at the same time, intrahorizontal dynamics in Canada render the institutionalization of IGAs and their mutual integration comparatively difficult.

The American case takes a middle position between Canadian and Swiss substate dynamics: the effective number of nonoverlapping governments (1.651) shows that usually one party has ruled in most of the substates. Hence, the horizontal conflict potential due to ideological incongruence has been fairly moderate. The percentage of nonoverlapping governments is on average only 43, meaning that in a majority of states each party occupies at least one branch of government, which also moderates interstate relations. At the same time, it complicates intrastate relations: the separation of branches as a constitutional power-sharing structure characterizes the internal political process to a wider extent than party dynamics do because parties are organizationally weak (Katz 1994). This dominance of constitutional structures has evident implications for the interpretation of the effective number of nonoverlapping governments: although there has been an increase in unified state governments over the years, this indicates a limited conflict potential rather than a unifying effect on the horizontal level. The complexity of the configuration is still high owing to compulsory power sharing. Moreover, because there have been no complete alternations, the competitive pressure is limited, which reduces incentives for blame shifting. In summary, the rather low competitive pressure and the low autonomy losses involved in horizontal interaction make IGAs a useful tool to facilitate interstate interaction. They are expected to be considerably institutionalized. At the same time, the constitutional fragmentation within the states is likely to weaken their mutual integration.

In Switzerland, intracantonal dynamics set very favorable incentives for the institutionalization of IGAs and their mutual integration. The competitive pressure is very low as there have been no complete alternations. Moreover, only 3 percent of the cantonal executives have been one-party governments and the number of
nonoverlapping governments is only 3.5 percent. Incentives for blame-shifting strategies rarely exist. Owing to the high number of oversized governments, a party would blame executives in which its own partisan pendants participate. Furthermore, owing to the oversized cabinet formats, the stability of the horizontal interest configuration over time is fairly high. As the cantonal party systems differ mainly in the weight of the single parties and not in the composition of the party systems (Ladner 2001), similar executive compositions across cantons moderate intercantonal relations.

In summary, the overall incentive profiles of the three federal countries with regard to IGR appear as follows. In Canada, where majoritarian decision making characterizes the single units, neither the institutionalization of single IGAs nor their mutual integration is expected to be high. In the United States the institutionalization of single IGAs is expected to be considerable as a result of power sharing in the states. Their mutual integration, however, is likely to suffer from the type of compulsory power sharing generating internal constitutional fragmentation. In contrast, in Switzerland, which is also characterized by power sharing (but of the noncompulsory type), incentives favor both institutionalization as well as integration.

### Multilateral IGAs in Canada, the United States, and Switzerland

This section examines the institutionalization and integration of multilateral IGAs channeling generalist exchanges that include more than half of the substates. It distinguishes those in which the federal government participates (vertical IGAs) and those in which it does not (horizontal IGAs). The methods used are document analysis and in-depth interviews with intergovernmental officials on the federal and substate levels as well as with the personnel of the respective IGAs. In particular, the latter allow for the connection to be identified between intragovernmental dynamics as the explanatory side and institutionalization and integration as the two dependent factors. Although the analysis of institutionalization and its driving forces focuses on generalist IGAs, integration is examined by referring to three kinds of linkages: first, the linkages between different generalist (not policy-specific) IGAs (if several of them are in place); second, the linkages between general and sectoral (policy-specific) bodies; and, third, the linkages of generalist IGAs to the federal government. Table 4 summarizes the respective features of the core IGAs in Canada, Switzerland, and the United States according to the criteria discussed above. It indeed indicates that majoritarian executive-legislative relations tend to weaken the institutionalization of IGAs, whereas power-sharing executive-legislative relations tend to facilitate it. Furthermore, it shows that integration is weakened by majoritarian dynamics as well as by compulsory power-sharing structures unbridged by party ties.
Table 4 IGAs in Canada, the United States, and Switzerland

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Horizontal Integration</th>
<th>Vertical Integration</th>
<th>Generalist-sectoral integration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Canada</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council of the Federation (CoF)</td>
<td>medium</td>
<td>CoF-center: weak</td>
<td>CoF-sectoral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(horizontal): medium</td>
<td></td>
<td>CoF-FMC: weak</td>
<td>arrangements: weak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Ministers Conference (FMC)</td>
<td>low</td>
<td>FMC-center: weak</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(multilateral-vertical): low</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>United States</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Governors’ Association (NGA)</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>NGA-center: medium</td>
<td>Coexistence of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(horizontal): high</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>NGA/NCSL/CSG-sectoral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Conference of State</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>arrangements: depending</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislatures (NCSL) (horizontal):</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>on policy field, weak-medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>high</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council of State Governments</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(CSG) (horizontal): high</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Switzerland</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>KdK-center: high</td>
<td>Only KdK: high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conference of Cantonal Executives (KdK)</td>
<td>high</td>
<td></td>
<td>KdK-sectoral conferences of cantonal directors: high</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As the FMC as a vertical IGA is weakly institutionalized, the linkage between the horizontal and the federal level is weak.
Canada: Intergovernmental Competition and Ad Hoc Coordination

Taking a closer look at the generalist IGAs, we can immediately identify the Canadian intergovernmental bodies as less institutionalized than the American or Swiss ones. The establishment of the horizontal Council of the Federation (CoF) in 2003 as the successor to the Annual Premiers’ Conference (APC) has been a step toward reorganizing interprovincial relations. The frequency of meetings has been increased to a minimum of two per year. The CoF rests on a codified founding agreement and has a mandate to exchange information and to develop shared positions. In addition, it has its own secretariat and is internally differentiated. Despite the growing institutionalization of this horizontal arrangement, one crucial criterion characterizing a highly institutionalized IGA is not met: the decision-making rule is still that of consensus. Each government thus insists on its veto to delimit autonomy losses ex ante because no decision against the will of a single government can be taken. As one expression of this structural weakness, conflicting issues are not placed on the common agenda. Whereas the CoF is institutionalized on a medium level, the First Ministers’ Conference (FMC), as the major vertical IGA, is weak. The FMC brings together provincial and territorial premiers and the prime minister and has long been the pinnacle of the intergovernmental system. It resolves conflicts on the highest level and gives direction to a network of lower-level meetings. However, all these linkages are informal and cannot generate any reliable patterns of interaction. It has frequently been suggested that FMCs be held annually and sometimes that they be given constitutional status; yet these suggestions have not been actioned (Cameron and Simeon 2002, 62). Meetings are organized by the Canadian Intergovernmental Conference Secretariat, which was established by the first ministers in 1973. In fact, this secretariat has its own personnel and resources, which are contributed by the constitutive governments. However, it is responsible for organizing, inter alia, first ministers’ meetings, the Eastern Canadian Premiers’ Conference, and the Western Premiers’ Conference. As a result of providing this multitude of services, the secretariat does not function as the arm of one particular group with a specific interest profile. Substantially, the secretariat does not stand for any organizationally bounded configuration of actors.

All in all, it is typical of Canadian federalism that actors attempt to avoid being obliged to enter into intergovernmental exchanges. This is particularly true for the federal government. As the convening of an FMC is the prerogative of the prime minister, FMCs are called only when it is advantageous from the center’s point of view. Typically, federal officials claim that these conferences are used by the provinces to attack federal policies, usually for electoral purposes, rather than seriously to face the challenges of Canadian society (McRoberts 1985, 95). This strategy of blame shifting clearly has a negative impact on the effectiveness of cross-boundary exchanges. Accordingly, despite the fact that it has existed for almost one hundred years, the FMC has remained an ad hoc event (Meekison,
Telford, and Lazar 2004, 16). From a comparative point of view, IGR in Canada have no constitutional or legislative basis and little bureaucratic backup. The respective arrangements are much too weak to change actors’ preferences; hence patterns merely reflect given intraprovincial, interprovincial, and federal constraints. Ad hoc coordination, often bilateral, remains the dominant form of interaction (McRoberts 1993; Cameron and Simeon 2002). Correspondingly, commitments made are only as good as the will of the participating governments (Lazar and McLean 2000, 168) and the scope of IGR is heavily dependent on whether the individual first ministers, in particular the prime minister, currently find cooperation advantageous or not (Cameron and Simeon 2002, 64; Lazar and McLean 2000, 166). In short, agreements represent lowest-common-denominator solutions (McRoberts 1993, 157). Flexibility is clearly paramount and would be easily delimited by strong IGAs.

As the FMC, as the vertical arrangement in the system, is called only irregularly by the federal government, the degree of vertical integration is also very limited. The creation of the CoF as an exclusively horizontal body cannot compensate for this. Interestingly, the original proposal made by Québec for the foundation of the CoF included the federal government as a member, but this was rejected by the other provinces (Québec Liberal Party 2001, 91–94). Evidently, the disposition to form IGAs that primarily facilitate position taking against the federal government is more of a general tendency on the part of the provinces than the sole result of the “Québec factor.” Furthermore, the central government profits from bilateral interaction on an ad hoc basis, in which it is usually the stronger party; hence, it has no interest in stronger integration. In particular, when dealing with financially weak provinces, it can minimize concessions without the involvement of stronger provinces, which tend to raise the extent of the concessions the center has to make in order to convince provinces to agree to its plans. Bearing this in mind, it is a plausible interpretation that, in the end, a medium institutionalization of the CoF was achieved only because the center was excluded from this process—especially because the federal government regularly tried to play one province off against another and had considerable success in doing so. Correspondingly, the individual autonomy losses arising from the stronger organizational backup of the council were acceptable despite the existing intraprovincial competitive pressure—because the CoF strengthened collective provincial autonomy protection.

With regard to horizontal integration, there is no formal clarification of the respective tasks of the two multilateral IGAs—the FMC and the CoF—located on the horizontal level. They coexist but, beyond the provinces’ overlapping membership in both, there is no indication of any regularized interaction patterns. The same can be said about linkages between national and regional IGAs. The linkages between the generalist IGAs and the sectoral councils vary, as does the organizational makeup of the single sectoral arrangements (Simmons 2004). Overall, however, structures tend
to be organizationally weak. Correspondingly, the regularity of sectoral meetings varies across policy fields from several meetings per year to one every three years. Despite the sometimes considerable frequency of interaction, the informal character of the councils weakens the bodies’ capacity to achieve relations beyond the exchange of opinions (Meekison, Telford, and Lazar 2004, 21–22). As a result, the active bridging of conflict hardly occurs.33 Hence, also in less visible structures that are more protected from political dynamics, codecision has not been achieved. In this context, one interesting development that has taken place since the late 1980s is the general trend toward decentralizing intergovernmental management to line departments (Johns, O’Reilly, and Inwood 2004, 8, 11). Thus, there has been a trend for policy-specific exchanges to be concentrated and intensified intragovernmentally, maintaining the constitutive boundaries within the system to a much higher degree: internal units conflict much less with the logic of competition generated within provincial boundaries than externalized IGAs do.

In summary, the competitive pressure within the Canadian substates affects the intergovernmental arena in a negative way. Actors attempt to maintain maximal flexibility in order to have the capacity to react to internal political demands and prioritize autonomy protection over stable IGR. The formation and re-formation of momentary alliances as well as the exit from alliances is quite common. In a nutshell, institutionalization and integration tend to be weakly developed.

**The United States: Compulsory Power Sharing and the Disintegration of IGR**

In the United States, the substate dynamics work much more in favor of the institutionalization of IGAs than in Canada: the competitive pressure is not very high, because the constitutional power-sharing structures within the states prevent the dynamics of a zero-sum game. The incentives for blame shifting are consequently limited, and substate actors do not have much autonomy to lose when they engage in intergovernmental exchanges. However, the United States is characterized by the dominance of constitutional power-sharing structures over partisan linkages, which establishes a barrier to strong system integration.34 As a consequence of internal fragmentation, the interest configuration is fairly complex and shows only limited continuity. In summary, on the process level, codecision, and with it cross-boundary harmonization, are difficult to achieve in the American context.

In organizational terms, the most crucial feature of American federalism is the coexistence of IGAs that represent the interests of the state executives and the state legislatures separately. The core state associations are the National Governors’ Association (NGA), the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL), and the Council of State Governments (CSG). Structures reflect the constitutional power-sharing mechanisms within the states. Moreover, there are organizational splits of IGAs that represent the same branches. As a counterweight to the NCSL—which was perceived as being too liberal—the more conservative American Legislative Exchange
Council (ALEC) was founded. On top of this, lower-level associations are numerous and some—such as the United States Conference of Mayors—are very powerful (Cigler 1995; Haider 1974). In summary, constitutional fragmentation and partisan divides structure the landscape of IGAs, while jurisdictional fragmentation is perceived as the stronger force. The multitude of IGAs renders the formation of one coherent interest profile of a single state and, more so, of the horizontal level extremely difficult.

Ironically, the high institutionalization of IGAs tends to stabilize interorganizational divisions rather than contribute to system integration. The three major state associations, the NGA, the CSG, and the NCSL, meet regularly and are run by an executive supported by a permanent secretariat; internal decisions are taken by majority rule. In terms of functions, the NGA and the NCSL are lobby groups, whereas the CSG is a service association functioning as an umbrella (Arnold and Plant 1994, 102). Similar to private interest groups, American IGAs try to make sure that their members’ views are channeled into the process of shaping federal policy. Consequently, the patterns of American IGR evolve around the vertical dimension. This means that they pursue regular contacts with federal officials and their internal differentiation is strongly structured along policy lines. Correspondingly, the strength of linkages of the generalist IGAs to sectoral associations also varies. On the whole, however, interest coalitions tend to be issue driven, and issues are handled by generalist IGAs only when a shared interest can be anticipated in advance: the most active role of IGAs is to identify preexisting common ground, not to generate common ground by bridging conflict.

To improve intrahorizontal linkages, the three IGAs are housed in the same building in Washington, DC, and have tried to increase mutual cooperation. Within the “Big 7,” as the major intergovernmental associations are called, the state associations are more closely linked than the other groups, first, as a result of shared memberships on certain boards and, second, because the NGA and the NCSL originated from the CSG. However, had interest convergence been strong enough, an organizational split from the mother organization would not have been necessary in the first place. As one interviewee put it, there is a “natural tension between the branches.” Accordingly, the pressure to cooperate in order to gain more weight in the system clearly conflicts with the IGAs’ organizational autonomy and interests, which led to their philosophy of cooperating not merging (Arnold and Plant 1994, 105). Most crucial, the legislative and executive IGAs differ in what kind of state autonomy they aim to protect. Whereas legislative actors attempt to protect their law-making competencies, executive actors are interested in gaining as much leeway as possible in the implementation phase—meaning large amounts of federal money without any strings attached. Ironically, the fact that in the United States the legislatures participate directly in the intergovernmental game indicates the weakness of legislative autonomy protection.
The flipside of this coin is that the central government plays the dominant role in federal-state interactions, and the states remain reactive (Cigler 1995, 131; Kincaid 1990). Any refusal to participate in nationally prescribed regulatory regimes or grant-in-aid programs is virtually nonexistent, even though nonparticipation is technically possible. Moreover, states do not usually try to take refuge by referring to the unconstitutional status of mandates that hurt the prerogatives of the states (Derthick 2001, 51, 54). The fact that states have been much less critical of national funding priorities than local actors (Cigler 1995, 144) supports this view. It is argued in the literature that substate actors accepted the “realism of the administrative state” and therefore cared less about competence distribution than about the realities of funding, implementation, and coalition building around concrete programs (Arnold and Plant 1994, 106). However, one crucial reality that feeds this acceptance is the unequal capacity of the two governmental levels to coordinate internally. For the states to act as one order of government against the central government and to successfully defend their own authorities, successful interstate coordination is a precondition. If it is not feasible, state resistance is of limited use.

Despite the growing use of interstate compacts in the 1990s (Bowman 2004a, 2004b), which are struck on the administrative level and supported by the CSG, interstate cooperation without central involvement does not provide a counterweight to centralizing tendencies. The level of obligation is high because once entered by a state, an interstate compact supersedes conflicting laws a state might pass later on. As a consequence, less formal agreements are preferred (Zimmerman 2001, 2–3). As an IGA representative puts it, “Compacts are a uniquely small thing. Most innovation occurs through voluntary replication of innovative state laws or programs.”

And informal or indirect coordination is too weak to provide an alternative to national regulation. Accordingly, after a rise of compacts in the 1960s, their number declined with the rise of federal preemption (Zimmerman 1992, 58–60, 141–142). In a nutshell, disunity among the states serves Congress to legitimize its own action as it can point to the failure of the states to do the job on their own (Derthick 2001, 38–39).

In American IGR the internal constitutional power-sharing structures have been impressively projected outside state boundaries and have strengthened the pressure on state and local actors to compete for national funding (Kenyon and Kincaid 1991, 91, 111). This intrahorizontal competition for vertical influence feeds back into and undermines new efforts of horizontal coordination right from the beginning. The coexistence of considerably institutionalized but loosely integrated IGAs is fostered by two parallel sources. On the one hand, the constitutional executive-legislative divide motivates the foundation of IGAs representing executive and legislative state interests separately. The linkages between the horizontal IGAs and the center remain fragmented, while the associations compete for influence over federal policymaking. In fact, despite their strong organizational makeup, with the
exception of the CSG supporting interstate compacts, the IGAs do not provide a basis for codecision processes and cross-jurisdictional policy harmonization. State IGAs do not represent the state interest but only their particular members, simply because “the state is no homogenous entity,” and this has repercussions for intergovernmental processes and structures, most strikingly by fostering centralizing tendencies.

Switzerland: Party Cooperation, Intergovernmental Codecision, and Integration

In Switzerland, both the institutionalization of the core IGAs and their mutual linkages are strong. The core horizontal IGAs in Swiss federalism are, first, the generalist Conference of Cantonal Executives (KdK) and, second, the conferences of cantonal directors (DKs) responsible for the exchanges in particular policy fields. Most crucial, in contrast to the United States, Swiss IGR are dominated by executives, despite the presidential-like structure of the cantons. This, first, reduces the number of IGAs that are located on the horizontal level and, second, facilitates the formation and representation of one position per canton. At the same time, the typically oversized party coalitions neutralize the impact of party ideology on intergovernmental processes because cantonal positions in the intergovernmental game already represent intracoalition compromises.

As the sectoral DKs are much older than the KdK, it is useful to look at them first, even though sectoral IGAs are not the major focus of this article. These bodies are highly institutionalized and, as a crucial vertical linkage, a delegate of the respective federal ministry is invited to take part in the executive or the plenary sessions of the DKs if involvement is considered useful. Correspondingly, DKs can foster initiatives and engage in real conflict resolution in which positions can be changed. Meetings can result in guidelines, benchmarks, or intercantonal contracts (so-called concordats). The concordat is the most formal instrument and is considered binding intercantonal law. Concordats aim at regulating concrete policy matters and are rather specific. Most cooperation, however, has a nonbinding character. Nevertheless, these provisions also become cantonal law (Armingeon 2000, 115). Accordingly, intergovernmental officials confirm that on the whole cantons comply with recommendations. Facing a growing demand for harmonization, successful cross-cantonal coordination is the only way to prevent authority migration to the center. Hence, cantons consciously accept restrictions on their individual autonomy in order to maintain the jurisdictional power of the horizontal level. Both the structural features and the results of intercantonal interaction indicate that codecision prevails in sectoral interaction.

Despite the organizational strength of the DKs, the cantons considered the general representation of cantonal interests in the federation to be insufficient. In 1993, this critical attitude found its expression in the foundation of the KdK. The initial function of this body was to ensure the consideration of cantonal interests in the
Europeanization process. Over the past thirteen years, however, it has become the core IGA, channeling general intercantonal and interorganizational transactions. Its organizational structure is very similar to that of the DKs, and it is also highly institutionalized. The KdK plenum meets four times a year. It is in these sessions that political decisions are made, mostly boiling down to common positions on certain issues or plans of the central government that concern cantonal authority. Decisions are taken by majority rule and the plenary session is accompanied by four meetings of a smaller executive committee that makes strategic decisions and prepares the plenary sessions. Evidently, the participating cantons insist neither on equal representation nor on equal veto positions.

In terms of interorganizational integration, the central institutions and the other IGAs in the system initially considered the newly founded conference to be a potential competitor (Minger 2004, 10). However, the KdK and the DKs now evaluate the relationship to the other federal peak institutions as productive. With respect to the formal indicators of interorganizational integration, in December 2001 the KdK and the DKs agreed on a general framework that clarifies the respective responsibilities and attempts to facilitate cooperation between the IGAs and the federal government. Among other things, the KdK has been assigned the task of conflict resolution when DKs fight over responsibilities (Jahresbericht CH Stiftung 2001, 9–11) in order to increase efficiency. The newest endeavor to strengthen the integration between the KdK and the DKs is to merge the two organizationally into one “House of Cantons.” Moreover, the KdK has made an active effort to integrate the Bundesrat into its meetings by inviting it to plenary sessions. These invitations have been accepted on several occasions in the past two years. More crucial, KdK-federal contacts take place on a regular basis through the “Federalism Dialogue,” a committee composed of Bundesrat delegates and a delegation of four to five KdK delegates.

Obviously, the internal dynamics generated by the power-sharing executives in the cantons are very favorable to the institutionalization and integration of IGR. Microlevel incentives have allowed Swiss regional elites easily to adapt to demands for cross-boundary cooperation. Cantonal political elites are widely protected from electoral punishment because oversized coalitions (on average 3.34 parties) are the most frequent cabinet type. Accordingly, electoral pressure is not perceived to influence intergovernmental processes and alternations hardly affect the daily business of IGR. Moreover, the positions of government members tend to be moderate because if issues carry some importance, they have to be acceptable also for their colleagues at home. Accordingly, party affiliation is on the whole hardly noticed. Under these circumstances, the incentives for blame-shifting strategies are weak. Moreover, strong IGAs facilitate interaction because it is easier for the federal government to have one interaction partner only and it is advantageous for the cantons to have IGAs that facilitate generating one coherent voice. Finally, in
contrast to the United States, Swiss parties bridge the executive-legislative divides within the cantons, which reduces the fragmenting effect of internal compulsory power sharing.

**Conclusion and Outlook**

This article has tried to demonstrate that it is fruitful to consider the internal dynamics of constituent states to account for the organizational makeup of IGAs. The theoretical approach has attempted to supplement a perspective on federal dynamics that refers to structural logics and tensions (Lehmbruch 1978) with a microfoundation based on a rational choice approach. In particular, the theoretical specification of intragovernmental incentives, on the one hand, and the empirical investigation of the motives behind the actors’ stances in favor of or against strong IGAs, on the other, are crucial as they have many implications for the possibilities of federal reform. In particular, the combination of abstract hypotheses with in-depth material has allowed for the generation of systematic findings on a phenomenon that, so far, has not been subject to much theory-driven comparative research.

The theoretical approach here has presented a set of testable hypotheses and a corresponding set of indicators that capture the variety of organizational properties of IGAs and the dynamics that systematically shape these bodies, their institutionalization, and their integration. To sum up the major findings, Swiss IGAs are strongly institutionalized, with interorganizational linkages formally specified as a response to noncompulsory intracantonal power sharing, whereas in Canada the organizational structure of the respective bodies and their mutual integration is much weaker as a consequence of intraprovincial power concentration; in the United States, on the contrary, IGAs are considerably institutionalized owing to the presence of power sharing, but they are only weakly integrated because of the compulsory nature of this power sharing. Accordingly, the empirical findings support the claim that in order to assess the comparative dynamics of composite polities, the connection between internal substate dynamics and their external relations provides a useful starting point. Moreover, as it makes use of rather abstract mechanisms, the approach lends itself to application to a wider range of cases to substantiate the current results.

Comparing the nationwide IGAs responsible for general coordination is a deliberately restricted focus, and, necessarily, there are some caveats. Further work is needed regarding certain aspects. Any more extensive comparative study on IGAs has to take into account, first, regional and, second, policy-specific arrangements. Their organizational properties, their functions, and their linkages to the nationwide IGAs are crucially important for the working of federal systems as a whole and can provide for a more differentiated picture. To be more specific, a systematic analysis of
regional and national bodies could provide insights into the conditions according to which issues are handled on a particular level. A systematic comparison of policy-specific IGAs and their average levels of institutionalization in different countries could contribute to a detailed understanding of how cross-jurisdictional policymaking is facilitated by particular organizational arrangements. A closer look at the types of issues dealt with in intergovernmental agreements and an investigation of the agreements’ degrees of specificity could complement this picture. Finally, in order to link politics and policy, an important step would be an analysis of whether and how intergovernmental agreements are finally implemented.

A study that compares IGAs across political systems and across policy fields could throw particular light on how far the system-specific patterns and structures that have been examined in this article also show up when controlling for policy. Hence, it could help to specify the limits of a systemic perspective on IGR. In more general terms, it could open up the possibility of systematically linking the policy-oriented and structure-oriented IGR literature. From a policy-oriented perspective, scholars usually address how cross-jurisdictional policy harmonization can be achieved in federal systems and why it tends to fail, focusing on particular policy areas (Banting and Corbett 2001). What policy-oriented studies usually do not provide is an overall picture of the patterns of IGR in a particular political system—a picture of the “structural logic of the system” (Lehmbruch 1978) that captures basic patterns and tendencies that remain visible when distinguishing policy arenas. Hence, the comparative analysis of policy-specific IGAs in different federal systems would allow for an integration of both perspectives, which have until now tended merely to coexist.

Notes

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1. Around sixty interviews of, on average, one hour were conducted in the three countries. The three groups of actors interviewed were federal and substate officials and intergovernmental personnel. They pursue different interests and, according to the principle of triangulation, their different views help to strengthen the validity of the findings. Moreover, substate officials were consciously selected according to the varying size, territorial location, and language of their states to ensure the maximum variation in opinions. To assure anonymity the following abbreviations are used: IGA: intergovernmental arrangement; Fed: federal government; POfficial: provincial official; SOfficial: state official; COfficial: cantonal official; Can: Canada; CH: Switzerland; U.S.: the United States. As all interviews were conducted in 2005, I give only the day and month in the notes that follow.
2. In cases where substantial agreements are struck within Canadian executive federalism (Smiley 1980) (hence, provincial governments agree to pursue substantial policy objectives), the provinces’ compliance is not very reliable. Research in different policy fields confirms the claim that compliance with multilateral agreements is difficult to ensure (Cameron and Simeon 2002). To give some concrete examples, despite the existing general development agreements, both orders of government struck deals bilaterally, which de facto led to ten different policies, of which some hardly qualify as regional development (Skogstad 2000, 62). Also, in the area of labor policy and social policy the implementation of agreements has proved difficult (Jung 2005; Lazar 2002). Provinces insist very much on their autonomy and strictly refuse any federal checks on whether they comply with agreement provisions. Recently, efforts have been made to develop common benchmarks to evaluate the provinces’ performance publicly. However, the federal government considers this measure unsatisfactory because the pressure of public scrutiny has proved to be very limited. In Swiss federalism, which is characterized by codecision arrangements, this problem is less severe, and nonbinding recommendations are considered rather effective instruments to coordinate policy (Armingeon 2000, 115).

3. Breton (1985) argues that citizens are best served in terms of policy outcomes when governments compete for their loyalty and, thereby, implicitly questions the relevance of IGAs’ structure. However, whenever the cross-jurisdictional coordination of policy is held to be useful, intergovernmental competition tends to generate unstable outcomes because only incomplete and self-enforcing contracts between the governments are possible. Most important, there is no third party to enforce agreements (p. 215). Strong IGAs are not functionally equivalent to enforcement mechanisms. Yet they increase the reliability of exchanges, facilitate monitoring, and provide the expertise to set up more specific agreements that strengthen commitments and make noncompliance more transparent. Hence, although competition can favor the selection of superior policy outputs within the single units, it can complicate the agreement and implementation of common solutions across units because it weakens IGAs that support voluntary self-enforcement.

4. The elements are assumed to cluster, without one element being a necessary condition for the other.

5. If more than half of the criteria are fulfilled, an IGA is classified as strongly institutionalized.

6. The party system’s degree of centralization and the disharmony between the levels of government that it can generate do not suffice to explain strong or weak IGAs, as Riker’s seminal work on federalism suggests (1964, 129–130). This is because multiparty systems can lead either to minimal-winning coalitions or to oversized coalitions. Whereas minimal-winning coalitions clearly allow for cross-boundary competition, oversized coalitions most likely prevent it—indeed, how strongly the party system is centralized. Moreover, the party-based approach does not consider the role different types of power sharing—in particular the constitutionally defined version—play. In addition, the party systems in the three countries under examination are all considerably decentralized, which largely controls for this factor’s impact on IGAs in the first place.

7. A second indication of dual federalism is that the administrative powers in a policy area are allocated to the level that is also responsible for legislation. This is the case in the
United States and Canada but less so in Switzerland (Thorlakson 2003, 7). Still, as this article focuses on the decision-making stage and not on implementation, the amount of concurrent legislation is used as the main criterion. In addition, the dependence of the federal government on the substates to implement policies leaves horizontal relations unaffected.

8. Calculated as the sum of revenues of the local and regional levels as a percentage of the total revenues (Braun 2000, 53).

9. Moreover, the role of conditioned grants deserves attention as it can create considerable dependence on the center. The share of grants (the sum of grants received by the local or regional level from the central government as a percentage of the revenue of the local and regional levels) is as follows: Switzerland 46.72 percent, Canada 61.9 percent, the United States 58.9 percent (Braun 2000, 52–53). However, this difference is unlikely to create a bias, because the institutionalization of IGAs as well as their mutual integration are expected to be stronger in the Swiss than in the Canadian and the U.S. cases.

10. Accordingly, the idea of permanently fusing several cantons to solve the problem of territorial entities that are perceived as being too small has been repeatedly rejected, and the single cantons still attempt to use their autonomy to a considerable degree (Freiburghaus and Zehnder 2003, 1).

11. In this context, some words are necessary on second chambers. Second chambers are the most crucial institution of “intrastate federalism”—federal bargaining within national institutions (Simeon 1972). The Canadian senate hardly provides an adequate channel for territorial demands. Although it can veto legislation, it is clearly inferior to the first chamber in terms of representational makeup and legitimacy and hence, in practice, does not function as a veto player. The Swiss and American senates, in contrast, are very strong second chambers and exert powerful vetoes (Lijphart 1999, 207–212). Although it has been questioned whether the directly elected Swiss and American senates represent cantonal or state interests, respectively, from a comparative perspective, they strengthen the positions of the constitutive parts in their federations to a much higher degree than the Canadian senate does. Assuming that strong interstate federalism—bargaining between central and substate governments—can partially compensate for a weak second chamber, the demand for working regional-federal relations embedded in strong IGAs should be stronger in Canada than in Switzerland and the United States. This, however, is not the case. Also, the features of second houses do not deliver an adequate alternative account.

12. One could also argue that a low number of units facilitates ad hoc coordination. The lower the number of governments is, the lower the transaction costs that can be saved by IGAs (Breton 1996, 211); the higher the number of governments, the more valuable these bodies become. However, this factor does not deliver an unambiguous account of organizational differences. If the number of units were the major determinant of the strength of IGAs, bodies including the same number of units (regional bodies in Switzerland and the United States, compared with Canadian national arrangements) would show similar levels of institutionalization. The observation that regional and national IGAs are similarly developed within one country reemphasizes the need to look at the intragovernmental processes that drive government choices.
13. A complete turnover replaces all government parties; a partial one only some of them.

14. Unified government is defined as the majorities of both chambers and the executive belonging to the same party.

15. One might argue that this is more demanding than the measure for parliamentary systems, as three different elections need to favor one party to lead to unified government. However, a similar problem occurs when comparing a two-party system with a multiparty system.

16. Congruence is assumed if parties in different governments belong to the same party family even if the party system is decentralized.

17. The relative size of the parties that participate in different substate coalitions also makes a difference. However, even if only a small coalition partner “links” one substate with the other, a moderating effect can be expected.

18. The number $N = 1/\sum s_i^2$, in which $s_i$ is the proportion of substates governed by the $i$-th government configuration.

19. The percentage of overlapping governments and the effective number of nonoverlapping governments need to be considered together. For instance, if one finds an average of 95 percent one-party cabinets, this indicates a high potential for conflict. However, if all governments are formed by the same party, the effective number of nonoverlapping governments is one, so in fact the opposite is the case: the horizontal level is ideologically very homogeneous. Moreover, the more overlap there is, the less relevant is the relative weight of the nonoverlapping governments. If the overlapping governments constitute more than 80 percent, the effective number of nonoverlapping governments is not very telling and will not be analyzed.

20. Moreover, also a one-party minority cabinet is likely to dominate the legislative process. In particular when it is located in the center and has a bilateral opposition to assure legislative majority support should be fairly unproblematic. As a rule of thumb, one-party minority governments are assumed to generate similar effects to one-party majority governments.

21. If there is only one horizontal IGA in place that is highly institutionalized, horizontal integration too is necessarily high.

22. In fact, until the 1970s open elections were exceptions; hence political competition for office was circumvented. In consolidated three- or four-party systems usually, no more candidates were nominated than there were positions available. Today, open elections have become more frequent because parties are under pressure to be more transparent (Vatter 2002, 65–67). Nevertheless, this practice clearly indicates how strongly party cooperation—noncompulsory power sharing—shapes the power distribution in the cantonal political systems.

23. Results are based on data from Dyck (1986) supplemented by own data and data provided by the Swiss Office for Statistics and by the National Conference of State Legislatures.

24. The territories have improved their positions within the federation over time. However, they are not independent from the central government, and hence are in a weaker position than the provinces.
25. However, note that partial alternations have occurred following 61.5 percent of the elections. Frequent partial alternations increase the internal complexity and complicate the aggregation of a coherent state interest, and with it one intrahorizontal interest profile, a situation that disfavors integration.

26. Owing to the limited scope of the article, this view is deliberately restricted in several respects. It accounts only for arrangements that represent the states and, hence, channel interstate or federal-state exchanges. Moreover, it leaves out regionally based state associations.

27. What could not be sufficiently analyzed for the current article is the nature and specificity of intergovernmental agreements. However, as the classification of the single IGAs was quite obvious, this did not create any further problems.

28. For instance, a steering committee of deputy ministers prepares the council meetings and ad hoc committees of the ministers responsible for IGR can be called (Council of the Federation Founding Agreement, December 5, 2003).

29. Interviews with Canadian intergovernmental officials confirm that a deviation from unanimity in IGAs and a restriction of provincial authority are generally considered unacceptable. Hence, this is not peculiar to Québec, which rejects majority voting because it could otherwise be outvoted by the English-speaking majority. The double-majority principle encounters resistance among English-speaking Canadians who resent the special treatment accorded to just one province (IGA Can I, April 7; IGA Can II, April 7; Fed Can I, April 7; POfficial II, April 8; POfficial III, April 11; POfficial IV, July 12; POfficial V, July 20; POfficial VII, July 29).

30. POfficial III, April 11; POfficial VII, July 29; IGA Can I, April 7; Fed Can I, April 8.

31. IGA I, April 7; IGA II, April 7; POfficial II, April 8.

32. IGA I, April 7.

33. IGA Can I, April 7; POfficial II, April 11; POfficial III, April 11; POfficial VI, July 27; POfficial VII, July 29. The governments’ positions are more and more often mandated by their offices for IGR or directly by the cabinet before the negotiations. A federal official described the dynamics at FMC negotiations in the following way: “when people cannot move from their positions that makes it very difficult to run a meeting. Usually we go for lunch then, a very long lunch. . . . And what we do then is to talk and talk until everybody has called home” (Fed Can I, April 8).

34. SOfficial II, July 7; SOfficial III, July 13; SOfficial IV, July 21; SOfficial V, July 22.

35. The same can be said of professional associations such as the National Association of State Attorneys General, which sheds light on an additional intra-executive divide: in more than forty states, the state attorney general is directly elected and has considerable independence from the governor. Hence, even judicial actors pursue their interests separately and sometimes do so against the explicit will of their governors (Provost 2003, 37).

36. SOfficial II, July 7; SOfficial III, July 13; SOfficial IV, July 21; SOfficial V, July 22. Accordingly, the members of ALEC are also members of NCSL, while NGA and NCSL are clearly separate. Moreover, ALEC members in part engage very actively in the NCSL (IGA III, April 5).
38. IGA U.S. III, April 5; IGA U.S. IV, April 5; SOfficial III, July 13; SOfficial II, July 7.
41. The observed weakness refers only to the decision-making phase, not to policy implementation, where the states might possess considerable leeway over how and whether to realize central standards.
42. Pro-federal Supreme Court rulings alone cannot be considered as the major determinant for the states’ reluctance to insist on their own spheres of authority when confronted with congressional intrusion. Although the Supreme Court had supported centralization for several decades, rulings after the mid-1980s preserved state prerogatives 50 percent of the time (Elazar 1990, 15). Later, in the 1990s, the Supreme Court adopted a much more protective position toward state sovereignty (Conlan 2000, 140). And most important, only a small proportion of legal disputes reach the Court in the first place, and state courts have—with reference to state constitutions—shown a willingness to extend the protection of states beyond the Supreme Court’s interpretation (Hickok 1990, 84). Although Supreme Court rulings certainly supported centralization, states tend to involve the judiciary only when they are unable to extract sufficient concessions in exchange for central intervention. Moreover, court decisions, once taken, cannot be negotiated any further, reducing the attractiveness of litigation (SOfficial I, March 30; SOfficial III, July 13; Fed U.S. II, April 26).
43. SOfficial III, July 13; SOfficial VI, July 26; SOfficial VII, July 27; Fed U.S. II, April 26; IGA U.S. I, April 4. Unfortunately there is no common register of informal agreements between states, which makes it extremely difficult to specify how dense horizontal networks are (Zimmerman 2001).
44. IGA U.S. I, April 4; Fed U.S. II, April 26; SOfficial II, July 7.
45. IGA U.S. II, April 4.
46. Fed CH I, June 26; IGA CH II, June 27; IGA CH IV, June 28; IGA CH VIII, June 29; COfficial I, July 15; COfficial IV, August 8.
47. They usually have a permanent secretariat that represents the respective conference in committees and working groups on the intercantonal and national level during the year. In addition to the plenum, which embraces representatives from all cantons responsible for the respective policy field, each conference has an executive that runs the respective bodies. They are further partially subdivided into commissions consisting of policy experts from the cantonal administrations dealing with more specific policy problems. The decision-making rule varies from unanimity to majority rule.
48. Note that the federal representatives do not have formal voting rights (IGA CH I, June 27; IGA CH II, June 27; IGA CH III, June 27; IGA CH IV, June 28; IGA CH VIII, June 29).
49. IGA CH I, June 27; IGA CH II, June 27; IGA CH IV, June 28; IGA CH VIII, June 29; COfficial VI, September 5; COfficial VIII, September 5; COfficial IX, September 16.

50. Fed CH II, June 28; Fed CH III, June 30; IGA CH IV, June 26; COfficial VII, September 5; COfficial IX, September 16; COfficial X, September 28.

51. Fed CH I, June 26; Fed CH II, June 28; IGA CH II, June 27; IGA CH III, June 27; COfficial III, July 27; COfficial IV, August 8; COfficial V, August 16; COfficial VI, September 5; COfficial VII, September 5; COfficial XI, October 13.

52. Fed CH II, June 28; IGA CH V, June 28; COfficial I, July 15; COfficial III, July 27; IGA CH IV, June 28; IGA CH V, June 28; IGA CH VI, June 29.

53. It is composed of nine members selected through a regional distributive scheme.


55. IGA CH III, June 27; IGA CH VI, June 29; Fed CH II, June 28.

56. Until now a secretary in Berne has been shared between a few DKs. However, the arrangements remain organizationally separated, not least because some DKs rejected a real organizational fusion that could undermine the DKs’ role in channeling policy-specific exchanges.

57. Fed CH II, June 28; IGA CH I, June 27; IGA CH II, June 27; IGA CH IV, June 28; IGA CH VII, June 29; COfficial VI, September 5; COfficial VIII, September 16; COfficial X, September 28; COfficial XI, October 13.

58. IGA CH IV, June 28; IGA VIII, June 29; COfficial I, July 15; COfficial III, July 27; COfficial IV, August 8; COfficial VI, September 5; COfficial VII, September 5; COfficial XI, October 13.

59. Fed CH I, June 26; Fed CH II, June 28; Fed CH III, June 30; IGA CH I, June 27; IGA CH II, June 27; IGA CH III, June 27; COfficial XI, October 13.

60. See, for an application to Spain, Bolleyer (forthcoming).

References


