

Online Appendix

1.3 Issue Evolution in the Legislature

Carmines and Stimson (1989) show that the kind of change in policy positions that I have demonstrated in Figure 1 is accompanied by change in the composition of parties in the legislature. First, a period of flux involves a sorting of members of the legislature as old members change their positions or are replaced by a new generation with the new issue orientation. While this change occurs there will be intra-party division but conversions and generational replacement imply that party elites will become less divided and more homogeneous over time because it becomes harder to be selected as a prospective representative of the party if one does not support the new policy.

While there are surveys of Labour and Conservative MPs from the third era of Figure 1 that can tell us about change from the second, there are no surveys of MPs from the second era to tell us about change from the first. Although the parties adopted very distinct positions in the 1974 election, with Labour promising a renegotiation of the UK's terms of membership the 1975 referendum shows that there was real intra-party division, especially in the Labour Party, where cabinet members campaigned on each side of the referendum, while a party conference in April 1975 voted by a large margin against continued memberships of the Community. But the party became more united in its opposition with the marginalization of pro-Europeans such as Roy Jenkins and then other members of the party who founded or joined the SDP, such that within a parliament it was hard to be a pro-European Labour MP.

The surveys of Labour and Conservative MPs that there are show evidence of precisely the kind of elite compositional change in British politics that is consistent with an issue evolution (Baker et al. 1999; Berrington and Hague 1998; Daniels 1998). A 1996 survey of Labour MPs showed much more hostility towards the EU among MPs elected before 1983 than those from the 1987-92 cohort, for example (Daniels 1998). The same

survey also showed that Labour *candidates* selected in safe seats where the incumbent was retiring, or in target seats, were far more likely to favour than oppose joining a single currency, reflecting a sea change from what the party had stood for in 1983. Meanwhile, by the end of the Major government, in the Conservative Party, “the tide seemed to turn against the pro-Europeans within the constituencies. The arithmetic of retirement and replacement was against them” (Berrington and Hague 1998, 67). A 1998 survey of Conservative MPs showed that two-thirds thought joining the single currency would “signal the end of the UK as a sovereign nation” and four-fifths wanted an Act of Parliament to affirm parliamentary supremacy (Baker et al. 1999). Berrington and Hague argue that the election of William Hague as the party leader to replace John Major in 1997 put the capstone on the Conservative Party’s conversion to Euroscepticism.¹ Indeed, Bale (2011) estimates that the proportion of Eurosceptic Conservative MPs went from 58 percent in 1992 to 85 percent in 1997 and 90 percent in the 2001 parliament.

Moreover, an analysis of MPs’ behaviour over the Lisbon Treaty in 2008 suggests that a new equilibrium has been established (Cowley and Stuart 2010). While the rationale for Cowley and Stuart’s article is that old assumptions about the EU as a source of intra-party division are outdated, their evidence is entirely consistent with the notion of a new party equilibrium as a result of conversion and replacement. On most votes on the treaty the two main parties were united and on opposite sides of the issue, for example. Pro-European rebels in the Conservative Party “effectively consisted of just four MPs” (140-1).² More anti-EU

¹ Although Major himself may have benefited from being perceived as more hostile to Europe than Michael Heseltine in the leadership election of 1990 (Bale 2011).

² As Bale (2011, 379) writes, Euroscepticism is now “a given rather than a touchstone” in the Conservative Party. This may seem odd in the light of the recent rebellion by Conservative backbenchers wanting a referendum on the EU. However, the rebellion appears to have been about internal Conservative Party discontent with their leadership and with the coalition rather than about orientations towards the EU. As far as Europe is concerned, as Andrew Rawnsley put it the day before the vote, “The Tory Eurosceptics don't know how to cope with

Labour MP's rebelled against their government's position but they were still few in number and tended to be from older parliamentary cohorts. Thus, Cowley and Stuart conclude that "division has now been largely replaced by inter-party division, as largely united political parties face each other" (145), clear evidence of elite-level sorting.

Additional References (not in main text)

- Baker, David, Andrew Gamble, David Seawright, and Katrina Bull. 1999. "MPs and Europe: Enthusiasm, Circumspection or Outright Scepticism?" *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties* 9: 171-185.
- Berrington, Hugh, and Rod Hague. 1998. "Europe, Thatcherism and Traditionalism: Opinion, Rebellion and the Maastricht Treaty in the Backbench Conservative Party, 1992-1994." *West European Politics* 21: 44-71.
- Cowley, Philip, and Mark Stuart. 2010. "Where Has All the Trouble Gone? British Intra-Party Parliamentary Divisions During the Lisbon Ratification." *British Politics* 5: 133-148.
- Daniels, Philip. 1998. "From Hostility to 'Constructive Engagement': The Europeanisation of the Labour Party." *West European Politics* 21: 72-96

success. They have captured the Conservative party almost in its entirety" ("The Tory Eurosceptics are on a roll. So why are they still so cross?" *The Observer*, 23/10/11).

Figure A5: Who Changed Position on the EU without changing Party ID? Conservative and Labour Identifiers, 1964-2010





Figure A6: The Relationship between Views on Europe and Vote Choice



* = attitude towards EU significant at $p < .05$ (in 1992 $p = .06$)

Notes: Point estimates are from multinomial logit models of vote choice, where the categories are: voted Conservative, voted Labour, voted for another party, did not vote. The independent variables are views on the EU and a dummy variable for respondents who said they 'did not know' when asked for their views on the EU.

Coding of Variables

Cross-Sectional BES Surveys

Attitudes toward the EU

All recoded from 0 to 1

1964: v0254, 1966: v0255, 1970: v70035, Feb. 1974: feb058, Oct. 1974: oct058, 1979: m069108, 1983: q43b, 1987: v24a, 1992: v27, 1997: eec, 2001: bq37, 2005: bq36, 2010: aq34

Party Identification

1964: v0445,v0449,v0453 1966: v0446, v0450,v0454, 1970: v70089-v70093, Feb. 1974: feb129-feb133, Oct. 1974: oct129-oct133, 1979: m129156,m130157,m131158, 1983: q13a-q13c, 1987: v12a-v12c, 1992: va6a-v6c, vb13a-vb13c, 1997: ptythnk, ptycls, 2001: aq5a-aq5c, 2005: apartyid, 2010: aq10_1-aq10_3

Perceptions of where the Conservative and Labour Parties stand on Europe

1964: v0257, 1966: v0258, 1970: v70037, Feb. 1974: feb060,feb061, Oct. 1974: oct060,oct061, 1979: m000104 m000105, 1992: va39b, va39c, 1997: conecind,labecind, 2001: coneci01, labeci01 (from 1997-2001 panel), 2005: aq30b,aq30c

Political Awareness

Respondents divided as close as possible into three equal groups of high, medium, low political awareness from:

1964: v0126 (interest in campaign), 1966: v0127 (interest in campaign), 1970: v70017 (interest in campaign), Feb. 1974: feb024 (interest in politics), Oct. 1974: oct024 (interest in politics), 1979: m024061 (interest in politics), 1992: polquiz (factual political knowledge), 1997: polquiz2 (factual political knowledge), 2001: politc01 (from 1997-2001 panel—interest in politics), 2005: bq64b-bq64h (factual political knowledge), 2010: bq79_1-bq79_8 (factual political knowledge)

Vote Preference

1964: v0356,v0363, 1966: v0357,v0364, 1970: v70065,v70066, Feb. 1974: feb114,feb115, Oct. 1974: oct114,oct115, 1979: m114145, m115147, 1983: q7a,q9a, 1987: v6a,v8a, 1992: v8,v9a, 1997: voted,vote, 2001: bq8a,bq8b, 2005: bq12a,bq12b, 2010: aq11_1,aq11_2

BES Panel Surveys

Attitudes toward the EU (panel surveys)

All recoded from 0 to 1

1964-1970: v0254,v0255,v0256
1969-1970-1974: v70035,v74025
1974-1974-1975-1979: feb058,oct058,oct069,m069108
1983-1986-1987: q43b,t24
1987-1992: v24a,y24a
1992-1997: eec92,eec97

1997-2001: eec97,eec01
2005-2010: pre_q101,cam_q61

I define “positive change” in attitudes towards the EU as a change from favoring withdrawal, judging Britain to be worse off economically as a result of membership (1979), or disapproving of membership, to neutrality (where scales had a midpoint), wanting Britain to stay in the EU, thinking Britain better off economically, or approving of membership; *or* from neutrality to wanting Britain to stay in the EU etc. “Negative change” is the opposite.

Party Identification

1964-1970: v0445-v0447,v0453-v0455
1969-1970-1974: v70089-v70093,v74069-v74073
1974-1974-1975-1979: feb129-feb133,oct129-oct133,m129156,m130157,m131158
1983-1986-1987: q13a-q13c,t3avb-t3cvb,t10ava-t10cva
1987-1992: v12a-v12c,y10a-y10c
1992-1997: ptytha92,ptycla92,idstra92,ptythb92,ptyclb92,istrb92,ptytha97,ptycla97,idstra97,ptythb97,ptyclb97,istrb97
1997-2001: ptythn97,ptycln97,idstrn97, ptythn01,ptycln01,idstrn01
2005-2010: pre_q29-pre_q33,aaq28-aaq32