Phenomenal concepts are concepts of what it is like, which conscious thinkers acquire through introspection, and which various contemporary philosophers of mind claim to exhibit distinctive semantic and constitutive characteristics relevant to the assessment of influential anti-physicalist arguments. Michael Tye has recently argued that none of our concepts of phenomenal qualities exhibit the characteristics claimed for these concepts. His argument exploits a Burgean social externalist thesis according to which concepts expressed by terms such as ‘pain’ and ‘red’ are deferential. I explore the prospects of a response which resists that thesis rather bluntly, by denying that phenomenal concepts are expressed by terms of natural languages. I defend that denial and its consequences, but conclude by tentatively considering two more concessive positions. According to the first of these, phenomenal contents are not semantically expressed by natural language terms, but are pragmatically conveyed by them. The second is a kind of contextualism according to which different people express different (indexical-like) contents with certain natural language expressions associated with phenomenology.