Undergraduate Module Descriptor

POL1027: Strategic Theory and Contemporary International Conflict

This module descriptor refers to the 2018/9 academic year.

Module Content

Syllabus Plan

It is envisaged that the syllabus will include the following topics in the following order although precise content and order may vary: introduction to rational choice theory, basic concepts in game theory and the strategic approach, power and managing insecurity, the role of the public in coercive foreign policies such as military interventions and the imposition of economic sanctions, inter-state conflicts, civil conflicts, ethnic conflicts, transnational terrorism, alliances, arms races, and the logic of deterrence.

Learning and Teaching

This table provides an overview of how your hours of study for this module are allocated:

Scheduled Learning and Teaching ActivitiesGuided independent studyPlacement / study abroad
26.5123.50

...and this table provides a more detailed breakdown of the hours allocated to various study activities:

CategoryHours of study timeDescription
Scheduled Learning and Teaching Activity 16.511 x 1.5 hour lectures
Scheduled Learning and Teaching Activity 1010 x 1 hour tutorials
Guided Independent Study123.5Preparation and completion of coursework: • 40 hours of tutorial preparation • 83.5 hours of assessment preparation and completion

Online Resources

This module has online resources available via ELE (the Exeter Learning Environment).

ELE http://vle.exeter.ac.uk/

 

Other Learning Resources

Other resources: Other materials and resources will be identified by the module convener in lectures and via ELE and by tutors in tutorials.

How this Module is Assessed

In the tables below, you will see reference to 'ILO's. An ILO is an Intended Learning Outcome - see Aims and Learning Outcomes for details of the ILOs for this module.

Formative Assessment

A formative assessment is designed to give you feedback on your understanding of the module content but it will not count towards your mark for the module.

Form of assessmentSize of the assessment (eg length / duration)ILOs assessedFeedback method
Class presentation5 minutes1-9Written
Online quiz30 minutes1-9Written

Summative Assessment

A summative assessment counts towards your mark for the module. The table below tells you what percentage of your mark will come from which type of assessment.

CourseworkWritten examsPractical exams
40600

...and this table provides further details on the summative assessments for this module.

Form of assessment% of creditSize of the assessment (eg length / duration)ILOs assessedFeedback method
Examination602 hours1-9Written
Essay401500 words1-9Written
0
0
0
0

Re-assessment

Re-assessment takes place when the summative assessment has not been completed by the original deadline, and the student has been allowed to refer or defer it to a later date (this only happens following certain criteria and is always subject to exam board approval). For obvious reasons, re-assessments cannot be the same as the original assessment and so these alternatives are set. In cases where the form of assessment is the same, the content will nevertheless be different.

Original form of assessmentForm of re-assessmentILOs re-assessedTimescale for re-assessment
ExaminationExamination (2 hours)1-9August/September reassessment period
Essay1500 word essay1-9August/September reassessment period

Indicative Reading List

This reading list is indicative - i.e. it provides an idea of texts that may be useful to you on this module, but it is not considered to be a confirmed or compulsory reading list for this module.

Karen Mingst & Arreguin-Toft: 2011. Essentials of International Relations, 5th edition. New York: W.W. Norton and Co.

Lake, David, and Robert Powell, “International Relations: A Strategic-Choice Approach” (1999) Princeton University Press. Chapter One: International Relations: A Strategic-Choice Approach David A. Lake and Robert Powell 3-38 and Chapter Three The Strategic Setting of Choices: Signaling, Commitment, and Negotiation in International Politics James D. Morrow 77-115.

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, “Testing Novel Implications from the Selectorate Theory of War,” World Politics 56(3) 2004 368-388.

Geddes, Barbara, “What do we know about democratization after Twenty Years?”, Annual Review of Political Science 1999 2:115-44.

James D. Fearon. 1995. "Rationalist Explanations for War." International Organization 49, 3 (Summer), 379-414.

Bruce Bueno de Mesquita: “Testing Novel Implications from the Selectorate Theory of War” World Politics 56(3) 2004 368-388.

Thomas Schelling. 1966. Arms and Influence. New Haven: Yale University Press, chs. 2-3.

Robert Putnam. 1988. "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games." International Organization, 42, 3 (Summer), 427-460.

Robert Powell. 2002. "Bargaining Theory and International Conflict." Annual Review of Political Science 5: 1-30.

Kellstedt, Paul, and Guy Whitten, “The Fundamentals of Political Science Research” Cambridge University Press. Second edition (2013).Chapter 2 only pages 31-38.

Morrow, James “Game Theory for Political Scientists” Princeton University Press (1994). Chapters 1 and 2

Robert Powell, “Bargaining Theory and International Conflict,” Annual Review of Political Science, 2002

David Lake, “Rational Extremism: Understanding Terrorism in the 21st Century,” Dialogue-IO, Spring 2002.

Crenshaw, Martha (1998). The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Strategic Choice. In W. Reich (Ed.), Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind : Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Johns Hopkins.

Pape, Robert. 2003. “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism,” American Political Science Review 97(3), 343-361.

Baum, Matthew A. and Philip B. K. Potter. 2008. “The Relationship Between Mass Media, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis.” Annual Review of Political Science 91-109.

Aldrich, John H., Christopher Gelpi, Peter Feaver, Jason Reifler and Kristin Thompson Sharp. 2006. “Foreign Policy and the Electoral Connection.” Annual Review of Political Science 9: 477–502.

James Fearon: “Why do some Civil Wars Last so much Longer than Others,” Journal of Peace Research 41 (3) 275-301.