Module POL3054 for 2020/1
- Overview
- Aims and Learning Outcomes
- Module Content
- Indicative Reading List
- Assessment
Undergraduate Module Descriptor
POL3054: Nuclear Weapons in International Relations
This module descriptor refers to the 2020/1 academic year.
Module Content
Syllabus Plan
The module is structured in three parts. 1) Following an introductory seminar, the module tracks the history of nuclear weapons since World War Two; 2) it examines a range of highly contested analytical and normative problems created in the nuclearized era; and 3) finally, it examines competing arguments for how states should approach and manage nuclear weapons in our time.
Learning and Teaching
This table provides an overview of how your hours of study for this module are allocated:
| Scheduled Learning and Teaching Activities | Guided independent study | Placement / study abroad |
|---|---|---|
| 22 | 128 |
...and this table provides a more detailed breakdown of the hours allocated to various study activities:
| Category | Hours of study time | Description |
|---|---|---|
| Scheduled Learning and Teaching Activities | 22 | Scheduled Learning and Teaching Activities |
| Guided Independent Study | 50 | Private study reading and preparing for seminars |
| Guided Independent Study | 78 | Preparation for essay including researching and collating relevant sources; planning the structure and argument; writing up the essay. Exam revision. |
Online Resources
This module has online resources available via ELE (the Exeter Learning Environment).
Indicative Reading List
This reading list is indicative - i.e. it provides an idea of texts that may be useful to you on this module, but it is not considered to be a confirmed or compulsory reading list for this module.
Basic reading:
- Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (London: Macmillan, 1982).
- Lawrence Freedman, “The First Two Generations of Nuclear Strategists,” in Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, Peter Paret, ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 735-778.
- Richard Smoke, National Security and the Nuclear Dilemma, 3rd ed. (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 1993), Chapter 13 (pp. 236-263).
- Albert Wohlstetter, “The Delicate Balance of Terror,” Foreign Affairs 37, no. 2 (January, 1959): 211-234.
- Paul H. Nitze, “Deterring Our Deterrent,” Foreign Policy 25 (Winter, 1976/1977): 195-210.
- Robert Jervis, “Why Nuclear Superiority Doesn’t Matter,” Political Science Quarterly 94, no. 4 (Winter, 1979/1980): 617-633.
- Marc Trachtenberg, “The Influence of Nuclear Weapons in the Cuban Missile Crisis,” International Security 10, no. 1 (Summer, 1985), 136-163.
- Avery Goldstein, Deterrence and Security in the 21st Century (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002).
- Scott Sagan and Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed 3rd ed. (New York: Norton, 2013).
- Scott Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb,” International Security 21, no. 3 (Winter, 1996-1997): 54-86.
- Jacques E.C. Hymans, The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identity, Emotions, and Foreign Policy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), Chapters 1, 2 (pp. 1-46).
- Mueller, John. “The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons: Stability in the Postwar World,” International Security Vol. 13, No. 2 (Fall 1988), pp. 55-79.
