Undergraduate Module Descriptor

POL3054: Nuclear Weapons in International Relations

This module descriptor refers to the 2022/3 academic year.

Module Aims

This module will provide you with:

  • A grasp of the history of nuclear weapons from their initial invention to the 21st Century, via the Cold War;
  • The opportunity to evaluate competing visions of how nuclear weapons should be understood;
  • A critical understanding of debates around what drives proliferation and disarmament;
  • A vital context for judging the validity of competing theoretical approaches in International Relations.

Intended Learning Outcomes (ILOs)

This module's assessment will evaluate your achievement of the ILOs listed here – you will see reference to these ILO numbers in the details of the assessment for this module.

On successfully completing the programme you will be able to:
Module-Specific Skills1. demonstrate knowledge and understanding of key issues revolving around nuclear weapons and international security;
2. apply this awareness to contemporary problems of proliferation and counter-proliferation;
Discipline-Specific Skills3. display an understanding of the evolution of strategic theory and international relations theory, and their utility for contemporary decision-making;
4. exercise informed judgement about change and continuity in international relations;
Personal and Key Skills5. conduct independent research, exercise critical judgement and write clearly and persuasively;
6. demonstrate the ability to analyse complex and fast-changing problems and to have the confidence – individually and as part of a group – to design and advocate workable strategic solutions;
7. demonstrate the ability to work independently – within a limited time frame, and without access to external sources – to complete a specified task.

How this Module is Assessed

In the tables below, you will see reference to 'ILO's. An ILO is an Intended Learning Outcome - see Aims and Learning Outcomes for details of the ILOs for this module.

Formative Assessment

A formative assessment is designed to give you feedback on your understanding of the module content but it will not count towards your mark for the module.

Form of assessmentSize of the assessment (eg length / duration)ILOs assessedFeedback method
Essay PlanMax. 500 words1-7Written

Summative Assessment

A summative assessment counts towards your mark for the module. The table below tells you what percentage of your mark will come from which type of assessment.

CourseworkWritten examsPractical exams
10000

...and this table provides further details on the summative assessments for this module.

Form of assessment% of creditSize of the assessment (eg length / duration)ILOs assessedFeedback method
Essay1003,000 words1-7Written

Re-assessment

Re-assessment takes place when the summative assessment has not been completed by the original deadline, and the student has been allowed to refer or defer it to a later date (this only happens following certain criteria and is always subject to exam board approval). For obvious reasons, re-assessments cannot be the same as the original assessment and so these alternatives are set. In cases where the form of assessment is the same, the content will nevertheless be different.

Original form of assessmentForm of re-assessmentILOs re-assessedTimescale for re-assessment
Essay3,000-word essay1-7August/September re-assessment period

Indicative Reading List

This reading list is indicative - i.e. it provides an idea of texts that may be useful to you on this module, but it is not considered to be a confirmed or compulsory reading list for this module.

(This reading list is indicative – it provides an idea of texts that may be useful to you on this module, but it is not considered to be a confirmed or compulsory reading list.)

  • Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (London: Macmillan, 1982).
  • Lawrence Freedman, “The First Two Generations of Nuclear Strategists,” in Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 735-778.
  • Richard Smoke, National Security and the Nuclear Dilemma, 3rd ed. (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 1993), Chapter 13 (pp. 236-263).
  • Albert Wohlstetter, “The Delicate Balance of Terror,” Foreign Affairs 37, no. 2 (January 1959): 211-234.
  • Paul H. Nitze, “Deterring Our Deterrent,” Foreign Policy 25 (Winter 1976-77): 195-210.
  • Robert Jervis, “Why Nuclear Superiority Doesn’t Matter,” Political Science Quarterly 94, no. 4 (Winter 1979/1980): 617-633.
  • Marc Trachtenberg, “The Influence of Nuclear Weapons in the Cuban Missile Crisis,” International Security 10, no. 1 (Summer 1985): 136-163.
  • Avery Goldstein, Deterrence and Security in the 21st Century (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002).
  • Scott Sagan and Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed, 3rd ed. (New York: Norton, 2013).
  • Scott Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb,” International Security 21, no. 3 (Winter 1996-1997): 54-86.
  • Jacques E.C. Hymans, The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identity, Emotions, and Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), Chapters 1-2 (pp. 1-46).
  • John Mueller, “The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons: Stability in the Postwar World,” International Security 13, No. 2 (Fall 1988): 55-79.